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Appellant's Reply Brief - iii 
THE ISSUE OF IMPROPER JURY VOIR DIRE BY ASKING JURORS TO RA TE 
THEMSELVES ON A SYMPATHY SCALE WAS PRESERVED FOR APPEAL 
Olsen asserts that no objection was made to the questions asking the jurors to 
rate themselves on a scale of one to five as to their emotional state of sympathy. Defense 
counsel's question was broken into two parts which delayed an objection to the 
sympathy rating question until it was actually asked. In Respondent's Brief, page 9, part 
of the question is identified. However, the entire question and answer sequence was as 
follows: 
Mr. Hall: " .. .In deciding a case like this, it is necessary that you decide the 
case basically with your head and not your heart. You will be instructed 
that you should put aside sympathy in deciding a case like this. And I am 
going to ask each one of you at the end of my individual discussions if you 
would be able to put aside sympathy and study the case on the basis of the 
merits with your head rather than your heart. Is there anybody before we 
go into that who feels they cannot do that? I've had some people say, you 
know, I don't have sympathy for anybody. I've had some people say I have 
too much sympathy; I would be totally guided by the sympathy factor. But 
if you're on the scale of one to five with the highest sympathy level being 
five, how many people think they're a five on that scale?" (Tr., Vol. I, p. 
106, 11.24-25 - p.107, ll.1-17.) 
The question was not answered until another question was posed on the same 
subject: 
Prospective Juror Williams: I'd have to think about that. 
The Court: I'm sorry, sir. You'll have to give your name and number. 
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Prospective Juror Williams: John Williams, 588. I would probably be 
towards the 5 scale on the sympathy, but it's not towards one party. I'm 
pretty sympathetic to everybody. I have a lot of sympathy, as well. 
Mr. Hall: Okay, that's understandable. I have four daughters and I have 
found I cry if they have a 10-minute advertisement of the kids coming 
home from school. I would be one that would be dangerous that way. 
Anybody else who thinks that they are possibly too far on the 
sympathy side that they would cause them - I understand you're saying 
you could put it aside, but you probably would be little a [sic] high on the 
scale? 
Anybody else have any feelings about whether you would have 
difficulty in dealing with what may be sympathy for the plaintiff? 
Let me ask some individual questions if I can. 
I have to try and use these reading glasses. I apologize for that, but 
it's a necessary evil that I have at my age. 
Mr. Hall: And you understand 20-20 hindsight? 
Prospective Juror Sunderland: Absolutely. 
Mr. Hall: And how would you rate yourself on the sympathy? 
Mr. Schlender: Objection. 
The Court: Overruled. 
Prospective Juror Sunderland: After coming back from Iraq, I've seen a 
lot of stuff that would pull at your heart strings, but at the same time I've 
seen some stuff that can turn you cold. I would say I'm right about three. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.107 l. 18-p.108 l. 19; p.112 l.10-l.21.) 
Counsel asked essentially the same question regarding the jurors' abilities to rate 
themselves on sympathy on a scale of one to five of two different venire persons; counsel 
registered an objection which was overruled by the trial court. Similar facts were 
presented in State v. Severance, 132 Idaho 637, 977 P.2d 899 (Idaho App. 1999): 
Despite the magistrate's admonition, the prosecutor proceeded to ask for a 
show of hands from potential jurors as to who supported a change in the 
law. On appeal, Severance predicates error on this follow-up question 
Appellant's Reply Brief - 2 
from the prosecutor even though he voiced no objection to this second 
question at trial. Generally, the failure to object at trial waives an issue for 
appellate review. State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 79-81, 878 P.2d 776, 778-
80 (1994); State v. Drennon, 126 Idaho 346, 349, 883 P.2d 704, 707 
(Ct.App.1994); State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 448, 816 P.2d 1002, 
1005 (Ct. App.1991). However, in this case, the prosecutor later asked 
essentially the same question of an individual venireperson, and defense 
counsel then registered an objection which was overruled by the 
magistrate. Because of this objection made the second time the prosecutor 
asked the question, we will address the propriety of the prosecutor's 
questioning prospective jurors about their attitudes toward lowering the 
legal BAC limit. (State v. Severance, supra, at 900) 
Considering the convoluted manner in which the questions were raised and 
answered, Thomson submits that the issue was properly preserved for this appeal. 
Rules regarding voir dire examination and objections are no different for civil or 
criminal cases. Mattson v. Bryan, 92 Idaho 587, 448 P.2d 201 (Idaho 1968), citing 
I.R.C.P. 47(a) and LC. § 19-1905. 
Olsen contends that Lamb v. Burns, 202 Conn. 158, 520 A.2d 190 (1987) 
reversed the trial court's sustaining an objection to defense counsel asking the jurors to 
essentially rate themselves on the issue of sympathy. The comments of the appellate 
court regarding the necessity of allowing adequate voir dire was that the defendant 
should have been allowed to ask whether a juror, knowing that the plaintiff had suffered 
an injury, would think that the jury ought to award damages, as well as a question as to 
whether a jury would feel sympathy for a person encountered on a street who exhibited 
signs of injury. The court determined that those questions should have been allowed 
under the specific facts of the case which were as follows: 
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"In this case, the issue of whether feelings of sympathy would influence the 
jury's determinations is particularly significant. The plaintiffs had 
suffered severe personal injuries that included bone fractures and 
disfiguring facial lacerations. Moreover, it was indicated to the jury that 
the three plaintiffs who are the adult children of the named plaintiff are 
mentally retarded and, consequently, are especially dependent upon her. 
The evidence further showed that because he had recently suffered a 
stroke, the husband of the named plaintiff was also greatly dependent 
upon her, and that as a result of the accident her ability to assist him had 
substantially diminished. When a considerable potential exists for feelings 
of sympathy to have a bearing upon the outcome of a case, a query seeking 
to uncover the extent of a juror's susceptibility to such feelings should be 
permitted." Lamb v. Burns, supra. 
No such facts existed in this particular case; Mr. Thomson exhibited no outward 
manifestations of personal injuries; no members of his family had impairments or 
health issues which would appeal to a jury's sympathy. There was no potential by 
reason of the facts of the case for feelings of sympathy to have a bearing on the outcome 
of the case, and as stated in Appellant's Opening Brief, the court can and almost always 
does give an instruction that sympathy is not a factor to be considered in the jury's 
deliberations. 
Assuming for argument's sake that the Court does not consider the prejudicial 
effect of these voir dire questions sufficient to grant a new trial considering the other 
substantive issues raised in this appeal, Thomson does urge that the Court at the very 
least not sanction a uoir dire process during which jurors are asked to rate themselves 
on a scale, whether it be on an issue of sympathy, specific amounts of damage or any 
other factor that a jury may potentially consider in its deliberations. Permitting counsel 
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to devise a jury selection method which overtly or subtly requires the prospective juror 
to align himself with one side or the other before any evidence is even produced should 
not be a practice which receives this Court's blessing. 
DR. CUSHMAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCLOSED PRIOR TO TRIAL 
Olsen concedes at page 18 of his brief that whether Dr. Cushman is referenced as 
a rebuttal or impeachment witness is irrelevant; he was called by the defense to testify at 
trial to contradict the trial testimony of plaintiffs expert witness Dr. Shuman. The 
essence of Olsen's argument as to why he was not disclosed was that Dr. Shuman did not 
provide "accurate testimony at trial regarding his conversation with Dr. Cushman". 
Olsen concedes that if Dr. Shuman testified consistent with his deposition testimony, 
"there would not have been a reason for Dr. Olsen to call Dr. Cushman as an 
impeachment witness." At the deposition of Dr. Shuman, Olsen's counsel asked very 
few questions regarding his discussion with a physician in Boise, Idaho, concerning the 
applicable standard of care: 
A. I did talk to a physician in Boise, Idaho, to discuss the standard of care, 
as I believe most of the experts have, and that was the only physician that I 
talked to. 
Q. What did you talk - who was the physician you talked to in Boise? 
A. Austin Cushman and it looks like a Michael Tullis. 
Q. Okay. And when did you talk to Dr. Cushman? 
A. Both of these would be in November of '05. 
Q. And do you recall what you discussed with Dr. Cushman? 
Appellant's Reply Brief - 5 
A. We basically discussed who was doing thoracic surgery in Boise. You 
know, was it general vascular surgeons doing thoracic? Was it 
cardiovascular surgeons? 
And he said that there was a time where general surgeons would do 
thoracic surgical cases, but at the time in question, it was now all basically 
board certified cardiovascular surgeons, that there were enough in town. 
And so I then asked him, I said, 'Well, given this situation, if you go in 
and you're doing this, and an injury occurs to the phrenic nerve, what is 
your feeling in Boise, Idaho, whether this is beneath the standard of care?' 
And he felt it was beneath the standard of care. 
Q. What's your understanding as to the medical training and area of 
practice of Dr. Cushman? 
A. I believe he's a general and vascular surgeon. 
(Shuman Deposition, p. 30 L.10 -- p. 31 L.14) 
Olsen never filed a motion for summary judgment in this case and therefore did 
not test prior to trial whether or not plaintiffs expert witness Dr. Shuman had qualified 
himself sufficiently to be knowledgeable as to the applicable standard of care regarding 
Mr. Thomson's surgery. Olsen's counsel were charged with the duty of knowing what 
foundation would be laid with Dr. Shuman at trial in order for his testimony as to 
violation of the local standard of care to be admissible. I.C. § 6-1012 provides that " ... 
such claimant or plaintiff must as an essential part of his or her case in chief 
affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the 
competent evidence, that such defendant then and there negligently failed to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in which such care 
allegedly was or should have been provided ... ". It was not necessary that Dr. Cushman 
be of the same specialty as defendant Dr. Olsen as long as it was established at trial that 
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Dr. Cushman was familiar with the applicable standard of care for thoracic surgeons. At 
deposition, Dr. Shuman had testified that Dr. Cushman advised him he was a general 
and/ or vascular surgeon and not a thoracic surgeon as Dr. Olsen. It therefore cannot be 
claimed as a surprise that Dr. Shuman at trial stated sufficient facts regarding his 
telephone conversation with Dr. Cushman so as to meet the requirements of Dulaney v. 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160 and Ramos v. Dixon, 144 
Idaho 32 (2007). 
The direct testimony of Dr. Shuman at trial did in fact properly lay the foundation 
for his testimony: 
Q. And so then who did you call? 
A. I called Dr. Kostmann, and Dr. Kostmann --
Q. Is that Kostmann or Cushman? 
A. Cushman, I guess. Cushman is a general and vascular surgeon here in 
Boise. And so I asked him if he was familiar with VATS lung operations 
for removal of pericardial cysts; and he said he was. 
I asked him who was doing the surgery in Boise. And he said, at the time 
that I called him, that pretty much it was being done by the 
cardiovascular thoracic surgeons, but that before they had been here in 
significant numbers, he had been doing surgery of that type. He had been 
doing more open operations in the chest. 
And so he was familiar with the operation, he was familiar with the 
pathology. And I said: If you're operating to remove this cyst--
Q. First, before you get there, let me ask you this question, Doctor. Did 
you ask him about a specific time and place? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And what time period did you ask him about? 
A. Well, I said the time period that we're talking about is February of '03. 
So that's our frame of reference. 
Q. Did he tell you he resided here in Boise, Idaho? 
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A. He did, yes. 
Q. Did you make an inquiry as to what area or what locale you needed to 
know that about? 
A. I don't think I understand. 
Q. What city, or where were you asking as to the standard of care? 
A. Well, Boise. 
Q. And did he -- did you explain to him the type of issues that you had 
that you were investigating? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And tell the jury about that. 
A. Well, basically I said if this operating is being done by a trained 
physician, and if the phrenic nerve is paralyzed following this operation, is 
that a breach of the standard of care in Boise, Idaho --
MR. HALL: Your Honor, I would like to make an objection at this point in 
time on the grounds of foundation, and maybe ask some questions in aid 
of an objection. And I don't know if you would like to--" 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.222 1.8 - p. 224, L. 10.) 
Outside the presence of the jury on a voir dire examination of Dr. Shuman, 
Olsen's counsel asked Dr. Shuman the following questions: 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION BY MR. HALL: 
Q. Doctor, you indicated that you spoke with a Dr. Austin Cushman? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you indicated that Dr. Cushman was a general surgeon and a 
vascular surgeon. Is that correct? 
A. That's my understanding. 
Q. What do you base that understanding on? 
A. On what he told me. 
Q. He told you that he was a vascular surgeon? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you checked out his board certifications and training? 
A. I have pulled him up on a website that shows general surgery. 
Q. General surgery. Right? 
A. Yes. 
Appellant's Reply Brief - 8 
Q. And would it surprise you to know that Dr. Cushman is not a vascular 
surgeon? 
A. That's what I was told." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 225 Il. 3 - 25.) 
The court made further inquiry of Dr. Shuman as follows: 
[THE COURT:] Doctor, your testimony today is that Dr. Cushman told 
you, in addition to the fact that he was a vascular surgeon, that he also 
informed you that he had performed this type of operation sometime in 
the past; it just wasn't terribly specific as to the time. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, and not as a VATS procedure, because that's a more 
modern--
THE COURT: A VATS? 
THE WITNESS: VATS, V-A-T-S. 
THE COURT: What does that mean? 
THE WITNESS: That's video-assisted thoracic Surgery. 
THE COURT: I see. He hadn't done that as a video-assisted thoracic 
surgery, but he had assisted in those? 
THE WITNESS: He had assisted in those, and he had done open lung 
cases in the past. 
THE COURT: So he said he had assisted in the video-assisted thoracic 
surgeries during the relevant time, around 2003, in Boise? 
THE WITNESS: Well, he had done it in the past. The video-assisted had 
come around in the in 1980s, '85 or so. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 233, 11. 1-24.) 
Finally, Thomson's counsel concluded the voir dire examination with the 
following questions: 
Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Doctor, I didn't ask you did, when I first asked. 
Did you ask if what they did here in February 2003 with regard to this 
procedure was the same as you did and where -- anyplace else? 
A. Yes. The way I asked it, I said: I'm not familiar with Boise because I've 
never been here before, but what is the local standard in Boise if you have 
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this complication, and what is your understanding of the national 
standard? 
Q. And what did he say? 
A. He said: It's identical. 
THE COURT: All right. And that was Dr. Cushman? 
MR. SCHLENDER: Yes. Thank you." 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p 236, 1. 22 - p. 237, l.11.) 
As is readily obvious, there was little or no difference between the testimony of 
Dr. Shuman at deposition and at trial regarding how he obtained knowledge of the local 
standard of care: through a telephone conversation with Dr. Cushman. Most critical is 
the fact that Dr. Cushman was not called simply to establish that he was not a thoracic 
surgeon and therefore not familiar with the standard of care applicable; just the 
opposite. At trial he denied knowing the applicable standard of care: 
Q. Have you ever told anyone that you knew the standard of care for a 
chest surgeon? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you believe that you are qualified to render opinions about chest 
surgery in Boise, Idaho in 2003? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you tell Dr. Shuman that you did know the standard of care? 
A. No. If I can elaborate, if you would like. 
Q. Yes. 
A. vVhen I told him that I didn't know what the standard was, he said --
he told me that he would tell me the standard in San Diego, and then told 
me the standard in San Diego. And then said, "Do you think that that's 
reasonable, that it's the same standard in Boise?" 
And I said, "It may be, but I don't know." I mean, I agree that it might 
be, but I don't know." 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 883, 11. 1-22.) 
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This was not new evidence which came as a surprise to defense counsel; Dr. 
Cushman was not plaintiffs expert witness and could have been interviewed at any time 
by Olsen's attorneys, which in fact happened prior to trial. Even Dr. Olsen was well 
aware of Dr. Cushman's area of practice; he filed an affidavit dated December 1, 2006, 
stating "Dr. Cushman is a general surgeon practicing in Boise, Idaho, who performs 
general abdominal surgery ... Dr. Cushman is not a thoracic surgeon, does not perform 
chest surgery, and does not perform the type of surgery in this case, i.e. a thorascopic 
resection of the pericardia! cyst." (Exhibit 5, Affidavit of Craig Olsen, M.D. filed 
December 1, 2006 as per Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits.) 
Olsen emphasizes on page 26 of Respondent's Brief that " ... plaintiff knew of, and 
had access to, Dr. Cushman long before trial. As such, plaintiff reasonably should have 
ensured that Dr. Cushman was familiar with the applicable standard of care prior to 
relying on his conversation with Dr. Shuman as the foundation for Dr. Shuman's 
testimony with respect to the standard of care. Therefore, even if Dr. Shuman's 
conversation with Dr. Cushman was insufficient to familiarize himself with the 
applicable standard of care, this shortcoming was no fault of Dr. Olsen's and no fault of 
the district court." 
In fact, Thomson's counsel did "reasonably ensure" that Dr. Cushman would be 
familiar with the applicable standard of care and did provide solid evidence that even 
before Dr. Shuman talked with Dr. Cushman by telephone, Dr. Cushman was aware of 
the precise medical issues and standards of care to be discussed with Dr. Shuman. Dr. 
Appellant's Reply Brief - 11 
Cushman was sent the Thomson operative report, the Mayo Clinic report, and the CV of 
Dr. Shuman. Plaintiffs counsel, in his email to Dr. Cushman's office, advised that "Dr. 
Shuman simply needs to talk to Dr. Cushman and see what he thinks of the phrenic 
nerve compromise that caused the paralyzed diaghram [sic] in this unfortunate fellow." 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 85, not admitted into evidence.) Olsen argues that keeping from the 
jury evidence that Dr. Cushman had reviewed Mr. Thomson's medical records including 
the operative report of Dr. Olsen was harmless, since plaintiffs counsel was able to 
cross-examine Dr. Cushman as to whether he received those materials. This argument 
overlooks the fact that Dr. Cushman denied having Thomson's records or operative 
report placed before him; he denied knowing that the phone call would involve removal 
of pericardia! cysts, the phrenic nerve or any other aspect of the surgery. Plaintiffs 
proffered Exhibit 85, the email with the attached Thomson medical records, would have . 
discredited and impeached this testimony. Olsen argues that the court properly refused 
to admit the email exhibit on the basis that no foundation was laid. Dr. Cushman's 
secretary Bonnie Lee testified that Exhibit 85 was an email sent to her email address: 
"You know, I think I do remember something from this Dr. Shuman, but I probably just 
gave it directly to Dr. Cushman." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 905, 11. 4-6.) She was asked" Did you 
receive in your office, as best you recall, the documents that are mentioned in there?" 
The answer was, "You know, I would think so. And I would just stamp them and put 
them on Dr. Cushman's desk. It's nothing that I read." (Tr. Vol I., p. 905 II. 15-17.) She 
was also asked if she gave the medical records to Dr. Cushman, and her answer was, 
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"Yes"; she was specifically asked, "And do you recall, the documents you would have 
given him, would they be the same ones as listed there on that email?" Her answers 
was, "I would think so if that's what I received." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 905, ll. 12 -- p. 906, l. 4.) 
Exhibit 85 and the attached documents were not only relevant, they were critical 
to plaintiffs cross-examination of Dr. Cushman. As Dr. Cushman's secretary Bonnie 
Lee wrote back to plaintiffs counsel, "Dr. Cushman reviewed all the information you 
sent and has agreed to do this. Please let us know the date and time Dr. Shuman will be 
calling." (Plaintiffs Exhibit 86A, admitted; emphasis added.) No further foundation for 
admission of Exhibit 85 should have been required; it was established that the email 
from Thomson's counsel was received in Dr. Shuman's office with the attached medical 
records of Thomson, that they were placed on Dr. Cushman's desk, and Dr. Cushman 
reviewed all of the records prior to the time that he talked with Dr. Shuman. Thomson's 
counsel was denied the opportunity to confront Dr. Cushman with the actual medical 
records, the operative report and the email placed on his desk which stated that the 
discussion with Dr. Shuman would be about removal of a pericardia} cyst, which was 
critical cross-examination and information for the jury after they heard Dr. Cushman 
testify that the phone call did not address the removal of pericardia} cysts, there was 
nothing mentioned about phrenic nerves, and finally that Dr. Cushman had not 
reviewed the medical records including the Mayo Clinic reports or the CV of Dr. 
Shuman. Exhibit 85 described all of those documents; it was fundamental error not to 
allow it into evidence so that Dr. Cushman could be cross-examined and impeached. 
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THE KNOWN COMPLICATION DEFENSE 
Olsen's brief at page 44 states the following admission: 
"Here, as in Weeks, although there appeared to be no peer-reviewed 
published information specifically providing that injury to the phrenic 
nerve is a known complications of pericardia} cyst removal surgery, 
reliance upon medical literature addressing this rare surgery was not a 
foundational requirement for the testimony of Dr. Olsen, his expert 
witnesses and Dr. Orme." 
As stated in Thomson's opening brief, a motion in limine to exclude the known 
complication defense was filed on November 21, 2006, which was denied. No further 
objection at trial was required in order to preserve that issue for appeal. Slack v. 
Kelleher, 140 Idaho 916, 104 P.3d 958, citing State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 760 P.2d 
27 (1988). 
Dr. Shuman's testimony established that there is in fact medical literature 
refuting Olsen's position that pericardia} cyst surgery is so rare that it is not addressed 
in medical text. Dr. Shuman provided a table of "complications" from Chapter 5 of the 
Atlas of Thoracoscopic Surgery and explained to the jury that according to this leading 
text on thoracic surgery is the following conclusion: 
"So basically what they've got is, Dr. Mack has got 16 intraoperative 
complications that occur with exactly the operation that was done by Dr. 
Olsen. And there isn't any mention of phrenic nerve damage because it's 
so easy to visualize the phrenic nerve, and everyone knows that it's there, 
that you - even though it may be in the location of where that cyst could 
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be, although in this case it didn't seem that it was, you know that by and 
large you're always going to be able to identify it, see it, and preserve it. 
So that's why it is not on this list: Because it is not a known 
complication. It is a complication that can occur only because it's in that 
geographic area of the chest. But it shouldn't occur in normal cases. 
There are some instances where it can occur: In cancer surgery, horrible 
infections, radiation therapy, where you're going in second or third 
operation on the chest, where everything is so scarred. You can damage it 
under those circumstances, and no one would be critical of that. 
But on a first go-around, in this instance, it should have been well 
visualized." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 327 l. 23 - p. 328, 1. 22.) 
The next medical treatise relied upon by Dr. Shuman was the journal, Annals of 
Thoracic Surgery: 
A. This is from the Annals of Thoracic Surgery, which is a very good 
journal. It tends to be more clinical than some of the research. And this 
is "Resection of a symptomatic pericardial cyst using the computer-
enhanced Da Vinci surgical system," which is a robotic system which is the 
advanced from the VATS procedure. 
Now, you sit at a console, you put the ports in, but all of it is done 
basically from like a typewriter. So it's even -- you could be in the next 
building and still do the surgery if someone put the ports in for you. 
Q. In any event, in this particular article is there a specific passage that is 
of importance with regard to your testimony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And would you read it? 
A. It was on the second page. And as they talk about it, they say, "The 
phrenic nerve was easily identified and preserved without injury." 
Q. How about the next one? Let's take number 2, what was the name of 
that one? 
A. Number 2 is from the Annals of Thoracic Surgery, and "Complications 
of video-assisted thoracic surgery: A five-year experience," from Paris. 
And they had 937 VATS operations of various types during that time. 
Q. And what is relevant in that one, for the jury? 
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A. Of those almost 1,000 cases, the biggest complications were air leaks 
and pleural effusions, which is fluid in the pleural space. The neurologic 
complications: "One left phrenic nerve palsy after resection of a 
neurinoma involving this nerve." 
In other words, the nerve, the phrenic nerve was coming down, and part 
of the pathology was an out-pouching of a tumor of that nerve. So when 
they cut that off, that had the effect of paralyzing that nerve. But that 
would be a totally expected outcome of that type of operation. 
"Two patients experienced a transient phrenic nerve palsy after resection 
of a mediastinal lymphoma in one, and resection of a bronchogenic cyst in 
the other." 
So there was one bronchogenic cyst that had a transient palsy that went 
away completely. Generally, mediastinal lymphoma, you don't ever resect 
those. You just biopsy them and they melt away with chemotherapy. 
So you've got 1,000, and of all of those -- well, 937 -- you've got one 
transient damage. So the point I was trying to make is, this is not exactly a 
known expected complication of this operation. It's a pretty unusual 
complication. 
Q. Even in those circumstances, such as cancer? 
A. Yes. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 335, l.20 - p. 338, 1. 5.) 
Based upon these authoritative textbooks and learned treatises, Dr. Shuman 
reached the following conclusion: 
Q. Did you find -- finally, this question: Did you find one authoritative 
literature article, or textbook of thoracic surgery, which said that 
damaging the thoracic nerve is a known complication or a known risk of 
surgery when you are removing a pericardial cyst? 
A. No, I couldn't. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 339, l.22 - p. 340, l.3.) 
Olsen's brief repeatedly states that the testimony of his expert witnesses 
regarding damage to the phrenic nerve as a known complication of pericardia! cyst 
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surgery "was based upon scientific knowledge, many years of experience in thoracic 
surgery, and experience and familiarity with the phrenic nerve in the context of thoracic 
surgery. Olsen points out that "Dr. Wood testified that he teaches residents who are 
trained in thoracic surgery that injury to the phrenic nerve is a common risk of thoracic 
procedures . ... Phrenic nerve injury is definitely a known complication of operations -
any operations that occur in the vicinity of the phrenic nerve." [Emphasis added.] 
This generalized statement is simply a blanket that added nothing of substance 
helpful to the jury. Thoracic surgery "is the repair of organs located in the thorax, or 
chest. The thoracic cavity lies between the neck and the diaphragm, and contains the 
heart and lungs (cardio-pulmonary system), the esophagus, trachea, pleura, 
mediastinum, chest wall, and diaphragm." (Encyclopedia of Medicine.) Generalized 
anecdotal statements and suppositions are of no use to the jury. Muzzey v. Kerr-McGee 
Chemical Corp., 921 F.Supp. at 519; Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering Corp., 102 F.3d 
194. Dr. Wood had no experience in doing pericardial cyst surgery using the robotic 
system utilized by Dr. Olsen: 
Q. Would you -- would the standard of care require that, in the robotics 
systems such as the AESOP 3000 -- you're aware of that system, I'm sure. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you use that at the university? 
A. We use it at the university. I personally do not. I do not do a lot of 
surgery with robotic. 
Q. Why? 
A. I have not seen that there's an advantage of robotic surgery in my 
specialty that I think warrants me to go through the training to get that 
Appellant's Reply Brief- 17 
additional experience. So I've not invested in that for myself, because I 
don't see it at this point has enough value to our program. 
Q. Are there any downsides to it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Like what? 
A. The down sides are, for myself, a period of time that I would be not 
working, and learning how to use the robotic system. And learning a new 
skill set that has a learning curve, whether it be a period of time, I'm not as 
good at it. And the procedures generally take longer. 
And so if there wasn't a benefit to the procedure to my patient, I would 
not see there being an advantage for the procedure taking longer, or me 
needing to invest the time to get the learning experience. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 995 l.18 - p. 996, l.23.) 
As to causation of Mr. Thomson's damaged phrenic nerve, Dr. Wood had no opinion as 
to how it had happened, only that the injury could be attributable to just "bad luck". 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 991, 11. 6-18.) Neither Dr. Olsen nor Dr. Orme, the operating thoracic 
surgeons, offered any opinions as to how the damage to the phrenic nerve occurred. Dr. 
Symmonds likewise offered no explanation as to how the injury occurred: 
A. We don't have a distinct explanation for why this phrenic nerve isn't 
working properly. It seems to have occurred at the time of surgery. Based 
on X-rays prior to surgery showing a diaphragm in a normal position, and 
then X-rays after surgery showing a diaphragm elevated, it would suggest 
that the phrenic nerve suffered some sort of injury at the time of surgery. 
Q. But we don't know what happened? 
A. Don't have the distinct explanation for it. My understanding of the 
surgery from the operative note is that the phrenic nerve was identified 
and was protected. It was not cut, and all attempts were made not to grab 
it or crush it, but to move it out of the way or to remove the cyst from 
underneath it without stretching it. 
So I think proper care was taken to try to protect it, so we don't have an 
explanation for why it isn't working. If it had suffered some sort of energy 
Appellant's Reply Brief - 18 
transmitted to it from electricity or from ultrasound from the harmonic 
scalpel, that could provide some injury to the nerve that would appear at a 
later date. That energy transmitted to the nerve might lead to scarring of 
the nerve that would gradually develop over the course of 
time. That might not be evident immediately after surgery, and might 
appear weeks after surgery. 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 828, l.1 - p. 829, l.2.) 
In the totality of all of the defense expert witness testimony, not one physician 
gave an opinion within a reasonable medical certainty as to what caused the phrenic 
nerve damage of Mr. Thomson. Baker v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., (not 
Reported in S.W.2d, 1999 WL 811334 (Tex.Dist.) Only the Westlaw citation is currently 
available), while admittedly not a well-known and cited case regarding the admissibility 
of expert opinions, includes an excellent review of some of the leading cases controlling 
admissibility. Dr. Wood testified that although he had found no literature, peer 
reviewed or otherwise, supporting a contention that this injury was a known 
complication of Dr. Olsen's surgery, he had "heard about it in case reports". As cited in 
Baker, "Case reports are not reliable scientific evidence of causation because they simply 
describe reported phenomena without comparison to the rate at which the phenomena 
occur in the general populations or in a defined control group; do not isolate and 
exclude potentially alternative causes; and do not investigate or explain the mechanism 
of causation." Citing Casey v. Ohio Medical Products, 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995); In re Breast Implant Litigation, 11 F.Supp.2d 1217 (D. Colo. 1998); Jones v. 
United States, 933 F.Supp. 894, 898; Hall v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 947 F.Supp. 
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1387, 1411 (D. Colo. 1996). Baker, supra, also cites Hartwell, 47 F. Supp.2d at 713, for 
the following statement: 
"It is simply inconceivable that the scientific community would, to any 
degree, find it acceptable to make dramatic diagnoses of the type at issue 
here simply by reviewing the operative notes of other doctors and briefly 
familiarizing oneself with the procedure performed." 
Dr. Woods admitted he had no experience whatsoever in doing pericardia! cyst surgery 
using the robotic devices utilized by Dr. Olsen. Olsen's counsel simply had each and 
every one of their medical witnesses agree to his leading question that damage to the 
phrenic nerve during such surgery is a known complication and risk of the surgery. 
Once again from Baker, supra, "an expert's 'bald assurance of validity' of his methods is 
not enough", citing, Merrill Dow Chemicals, Inc., v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tx. 
1997): 
A jury verdict cannot rest solely on an expert's bottom line 
conclusion. .. . His incantation of magic words like "reasonable medical 
probability" to support his conclusion that the Rogozinski system caused 
McMahon's continuing complaints does not make his testimony 
admissible. Citing Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 Fed.3d 1091 
(1st Cir. 1994); Havner, supra at 712. 
Confronted by his own counsel with the fact that there was no medical literature 
supporting the contention that in pericardia! cyst surgery there is a risk of phrenic nerve 
injury as a known complication, Dr. Wood could only state, "Pericardia! cysts are 
unusual and therefore there are not papers written specifically about pericardia! cysts 
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and certainly not a series of 500 pericardial cysts like we might write about 500 lung 
cancers. So pericardial cysts in the literature - that is, the scientific papers that are 
written about pericardial cysts - are virtually always included with other things that are 
similar, other similar cysts or other similar located tumors or pathologies of that area of 
the chest. And so it is artificial to look for a specific pericardial cyst/phrenic nerve 
injury paper, because I doubt that it would exist. It's just, there's not articles about 
pericardial cysts period, except for individual case reports." (Tr. Vol. 1, p 972 L.19 - P 
973, L. 10 ). This statement totally lacked the content of a foundation for statements that 
phrenic nerve injury is a known complication of pericardial cyst surgery. 
Dr. Orme did no better: 
"Q. Now, as an assistant surgeon involved in this type of surgery, were you 
aware of any known risk or complications with respect to the type of 
surgery being performed on Mr. Thomson? 
MR. SCHLENDER: Objection. Limited to being an assistant, not the 
surgeon. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. The witness may answer the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I was aware. 
Q. BY MR. HALL: What risks were you aware of? 
A. Well, in a surgery like this, there's always the risk of bleeding from the 
entry wounds into the chest wall. There's the risk of infection occurring in 
the pleural space, the space between the lung and the chest wall. And 
there were be a risk of an air leak from the lung, and there could be a risk 
of nerve injury. 
Q. And why is that a risk? 
A. Because of its course in the chest. It travels from the neck down along 
the carotid artery and over the arch of the aorta, and then runs along the 
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pericardium the covering of the heart. And it runs along the pericardium 
down to the diaphragm. 
And so this phrenic nerve is in a region where the cyst was in this case, so 
it could be something that one would look out for." 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 792, L. 9 - P. 793, L.13.) 
During cross-examination Dr. Orme admitted the following: 
"Q. I'm talking about a pericardia! cyst removal. Okay? On a pericardial 
cyst removal, using video-assisted thoracoscopic surgery instruments, can 
you cite to the jury one single article, or one single journal, or one single 
textbook in the history of medicine that supports that statement. Yes or 
no? 
I cannot, but I have not specifically looked for this either." 
(Tr. Vol. I, P. 812 L. 18 - P. 814, L.1.) 
Dr. Symmonds, another defense expert witness, confirmed that the "known 
complication" defense was baseless: 
"Q. Did you learn from textbooks how to practice medicine, partially? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Do you learn - do physicians, where they have run into a problem or a 
complication, is it in the practice of medicine customary that these 
physicians will write a paper or an abstract on that situation and have it 
published so that other doctors can read that, so that they don't make the 
same mistake? 
A. That's how we get a lot of our information. 
Q. That's how medicine works, is it not? In other words, medicine works 
historically. Correct? 
MR. HALL: Your Honor, object to the form of the question as compound. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. BY MR. SCHLENDER: Does medicine work historically, Doctor? 
A. Medicine works by physicians and patients trying to deal with their 
problems, working together I guess. The physicians learn from history by 
studying what has transpired, what other physicians have experienced, 
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and basing your practice on other people's experiences 1s only 
appropriate. 
Q. And there are hundreds, if not thousands, of medical journals 
published wherein doctors such as yourself and others may write articles, 
abstracts on problems that have arisen in surgeries or procedures. 
Correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And does your group subscribe to some of those? 
A. Sure. 
Q. What are some of the ones you subscribed to? 
A. The Journal of Vascular Surgery. I read Journal of Thoracic and 
Cardiovascular Surgery, Annals of Thoracic Surgery. We get numerous 
weekly journals that come in the mail even without subscribing to them. 
We get newspapers, newsletters that come out on a weekly basis. 
Q. And you have had -- I don't believe Mr. Hall asked you this, but about 
what time were you asked to work on this case? 
A. Several months ago. Initially I reviewed the records as a preliminary 
thing, and only in the last month did I get this large box of depositions that 
have been taken recently. 
Q. You took the time to go through all those? 
A. I went through most of them, I guess. 
Q. And hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of medical records. Right? 
A. It would probably end up being a thousand. 
Q. In your practice, you have access, to [sic] you not, through computers, 
the Internet, as well as medical universities, I should say universities and 
schools of medicine, you have access to textbooks of medicine literally 
around the world, do you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you can pull up, if you need to, either you or someone in your 
office can search databases of literally thousands and thousands of 
abstracts, to try to find something you're interested in. Correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Between the time you were asked to assist on this case, as you sit here 
now before the jury, can you tell the jury, did you find or do you know of 
one abstract, one textbook, one journal, which says that damage to the 
Appellant's Reply Brief - 23 
phrenic nerve during pericardia! cyst surgery, being done by VATS, just 
that the damage occurs for just some unknown reason? 
A. I'm not aware that that's written anywhere." 
(Tr. Vol. I, P.842 L. 7 - P. 845, L.13) 
Defendant Olsen offered no opinion that damage to the phrenic nerve during pericardia! 
cyst surgery was a known complication of the procedure. 
In conclusion: Not one of Olsen's witnesses provided testimony that damage to 
the phrenic nerve was a known complication of pericardia! cystic surgery based upon 
any scientific knowledge, their personal experience in pericardia! cyst surgery, or 
experience and familiarity with the phrenic nerve in the context of pericardia! cyst 
surgery. Olsen simply changes the ground rules by stating in essence that we need not 
have testimony regarding pericardia! cyst surgery; just any garden variety surgery on the 
thorax will do. This is tantamount to saying that engine failure is a known complication 
of operating a motor vehicle. Would such a statement be considered as "scientific, 
technical or otherwise specialized knowledge which will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"? (I.RE. 702.) None of Olsen's 
expert witnesses supplied "facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert 
bases and opinion or inference" (I.RE. 703); Dr. Wood reached exactly the opposite 
conclusion: there were no facts or data upon which he based his opinion or any 
inferences to be made from medical or scientific literature. Perhaps the most 
devastating admission by omission was the failure of Olsen's expert witnesses to cite a 
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single example in their collective surgical training and experience of encountering 
damage of the phrenic nerve during pericardia} cyst surgery. Even if this Court was 
persuaded that there need not be medical or scientific knowledge or opinion published 
anywhere in the world supporting Olsen's complication defense, it requires a leap into 
space to conclude that from the testimony given at trial by these witnesses, they 
established any experience in their lifetimes treating pericardia} cysts sufficient to 
provide a foundation for their ultimate conclusions and testimony. The trial courts are 
allowed wide discretion in allowing expert testimony on medical issues, but there must 
come a time and place when limitations on that discretion are recognized. It is 
respectfully submitted that if there has ever been a case to come before this Court that 
squarely presented this question, this is it. 
For the reasons as set forth above, it is respectfully requested that this case be 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this 19th day of February, 2 
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